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The ￿rst decade of EMU has taught us much about the power of a single currency to
integrate ￿nancial markets (see also Lane 2006a, Lane and Walti 2007 and Benetrix and
Walti 2008). In this review, I ￿rst discuss the quantitative impact of the euro on cross-
border ￿nancial holdings before turning to the macroeconomic implications of enhanced
￿nancial integration.
2 The Euro and Financial Markets
To a large degree, the inter-bank and money markets in the euro area very quickly uni￿ed
upon the launch of EMU in 1999. Moreover, the elimination of currency risk has generated
a very high degree of substitutability across the bonds issued by di⁄erent governments and
corporations across the euro area. Lane (2006b) estimates that, controlling for other factors,
bilateral bond holdings among members of the euro area are 97 percent higher than among
other cross-border pairings. While the increase in cross-border holdings is largely driven
by a decline in home bias, the increase in intra-area holdings may in part be ￿nanced by a
portfolio switch away from assets external to the euro area (Coeurdacier and Martin 2007).
The scale of inter-bank lending across the euro area has also grown rapidly. As shown
by Spiegel (2007), this has transformed the geography of commercial bank lending, with
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There is also considerable evidence that the single currency has enhanced the integration
of national equity markets across the euro area. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) ￿nd that
there is a ￿ euro bias￿in cross-border equity holdings: controlling for other fundamentals,
the level of portfolio equity investment is substantially higher between members of the
euro area than among other pairings (the preferred estimate of the euro e⁄ect is that it
raises bilateral equity holdings between member countries by 62 percent for equities). The
integration of equity markets was stimulated by the impact of local-currency mandates on
many institutional investors - the replacement of national currencies by the euro meant that
the feasible universe for such investors was greatly enlarged. The positive impact of the
euro was reinforced by the large-scale EU-wide e⁄ort to reduce cross-border transactions
costs in securities trade and the consolidation of national stock exchanges (most visibly,
the Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris stock exchanges are now under the control of
NYSE-Euronext). The euro has also raised the level of cross-border direct investment
between member countries: De Sousa and Lochard (2006) estimate the impact to be a
substantial 26 percent.
The high level of integration has transformed the issuance patterns and asset pricing
in the bond market. Historically limited by the small size of individual national markets,
currency union led to a dramatic expansion in bond issuance by European ￿rms and banks:
Lane (2006a) records that quarterly gross issues have averaged 15.2 percent of GDP since
the start of EMU, nearly double the 8.2 percent average during 1991-1998. As documented
by Pagano and von Thadden (2004), the rapid expansion of the bond market was directly
facilitated by the contribution of the single currency to increased competition among in-
vestment banks and an associated reduction in issuance costs and greater access for smaller
and higher-risk issuers.
The creation of the single currency has also encouraged entities from outside the euro
area to issue euro-denominated bonds. According to the European Central Bank (2007),
the euro had a 47 percent share of the outstanding stock of international debt securities
by the end of 2006. The propensity to issue securities in euro cuts across a wide range of
countries. Perhaps most striking is the rapid growth in the issuance of euro-denominated
securities by US residents (primarily US ￿nancial institutions). The US Treasury (2006)
reports that the value of euro-denominated long-term debt securities issued by US residents
and purchased by foreign investors had grown from $39 billion in 2000 to $339 billion in
2006, which constitutes an increase in the share of total long-term foreign debt liabilities
2from 2.1 percent to 7.2 percent.
The integration of bond markets has been associated with very high correlations in
bond returns across the euro area. Moreover, spreads across government bond yields have
narrowed to very low levels. While this yield convergence in part re￿ ects a convergence in
fundamentals and the elimination of liquidity premia associated with the domestic-currency
debts of the smaller member countries, it also re￿ ects the fact that investors regard the
bonds issued by member countries as very close substitutes. Although weaker, a qualita-
tively similar e⁄ect is found in the pattern of equity returns. Lane and Walti (2007) show
that, after controlling for common factors, the correlations in the idiosyncratic component
of national stock market returns have increased among members of the euro area, with
the increase in co-movements clearly beginning in 1998 during the run-up to the launch of
EMU.
Overall, the scale of market integration is impressive. At a global level, the creation
of the euro has led to a more rapid increase in cross-border asset and liability positions in
Europe relative to other regions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008). That said, the current
￿nancial turmoil has led to a resurgence in the importance of ￿national￿factors in market
dynamics and asset pricing. While the increase in spreads in the government bond market
may in part re￿ ect an over-due acknowledgement that the European Central Bank does
not provide a guarantee on sovereign debt, the events in the inter-bank market suggest
that asymmetric information problems are more easily overcome within the home system
than across the broader euro area market. The importance of national factors is re-inforced
by the important role played by national central banks in the Eurosystem in assessing the
collateral provided in ESCB repo auctions.
Turning brie￿ y to the impact of the euro on retail ￿nance, much remains to be done
in terms of promoting integration at the retail banking level. However, the launch of the
Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) in 2008 marks an important milestone in eliminating
the distinction between domestic and cross-border electronic payments across the euro area.
Further progress in the integration of securities settlements systems is also desirable and a
major target for European policymakers. In large part, the barriers to integration in these
areas are not technical but re￿ ect political e⁄orts by incumbents to preserve monopoly
power in their home markets.
33 Financial Integration and Macroeconomic Behaviour
A currency union should work more smoothly, the more national consumption levels can be
insulated from domestic macroeconomic shocks via cross-border risk sharing. In view of the
sharp growth in cross-border asset holdings across the euro area that we have documented,
this suggests that increased ￿nancial integration has improved the macroeconomic coherence
of the euro area. Holding other factors constant, this is undoubtedly true at a qualitative
level. However, the quantitative scale of cross-border positions (relative to indicators of
national income or wealth) remains relatively low, in view of the remaining high home
bias in ￿nancial holdings and the importance of non-￿nancial factors (housing, human
capital) in driving aggregate wealth dynamics. In addition, it is important to appreciate
that ￿nancial globalisation has also led to considerable growth in international ￿nancial
holdings outside the euro area, with considerable heterogeneity across member countries
(for instance, Austria has considerable assets in Central and Eastern Europe, while Spanish
banks have an extensive presence in Latin America and Ireland￿ s ￿nancial linkages with the
United States are very strong). For this reason, national wealth dynamics may diverge due
to di⁄erential exposures to ￿nancial shocks from outside the euro area.
Moreover, the high co-movement in asset returns across markets (especially within the
euro area) means that the scope for diversi￿cation is quite limited. This is especially the case
for countries where the coverage of the national stockmarket is narrow, such that it is di¢ -
cult to hedge national macroeconomic risks via an equity portfolio (Schmitz 2007). Indeed,
the elimination of national currencies has eliminated one risk-sharing mechanism, since
nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuations have historically played an important role in driving
the relative returns on nominal bonds (Neumeyer 1998).
Moreover, ￿nancial integration has been associated with a greater dispersion in current
account positions across the euro area, which has contributed to di⁄erential wealth dynam-
ics via the funding of property booms in countries such as Ireland and Spain (Blanchard
and Giavazzi 2002, Lane 2006a, Fagan and Gaspar 2007). Prior to EMU, a burgeoning
current account de￿cit in a small, peripheral European country would have prompted an
increase in the country risk premium, in view of the increased risk of currency depreciation.
Membership of the euro area has eliminated national currency risk and the ￿rst decade of
EMU has seen remarkably large current account de￿cits in some member countries, in large
part funded by loans from banks in other member countries. The pattern that a large pro-
portion of the cross-border assets and liabilities of member countries are now denominated
in euro will surely alter the dynamics of external adjustment, with no role for the nominal
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Although the current ￿nancial turmoil has certainly led to greater di⁄erentiation in
risk assessment across the euro area (for instance, bank shares in the de￿cit countries have
declined sharply while the spreads on government bonds in some cases have also increased),
the insulation provided by EMU remains considerable. In particular, it is illuminating
to contrast the ￿nancial volatility facing non-EMU de￿cit economies such as Iceland with
the relative stability of the EMU member countries. Although de￿cit countries certainly
face adjustment problems within EMU, the elimination of the risk of a speculative attack
in the currency market is surely a major bene￿t of EMU membership. By extension, for
the new member states of the European Union that have not yet joined the euro, the
risks of running large current account de￿cits while maintaining independent currencies are
considerable (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007b).
4 Conclusions
The introduction of the euro had a swift and quantititatively-large impact on the ￿nancial
markets of the euro area. While the 2007-2008 international ￿nancial crisis has re-awakened
interest in national di⁄erences in ￿nancial positions, the overall impact has been to sharply
reduce home bias in bond markets and (albeit to a lesser extent) in equity portfolios. Al-
though enhanced integration improves international risk sharing, other forces have acted
in a counter-vailing fashion. First, ￿nancial holdings by euro area investors in the rest of
the world have also grown rapidly over the last decade but with heterogeneous patterns of
exposure across the member countries. Second, ￿nancial integration has also contributed
to greater dispersion and persistence in current account positions that has been accom-
panied by divergence in house price dynamics. That said, the shifts in consumption and
housing prices are mainly a once-o⁄ adjustment to the new ￿nancial environment that has
disproportionately bene￿ted the peripheral and lower-income member countries: over time,
the diversi￿cation bene￿ts provided by greater ￿nancial integration should emerge as a
long-term gain from the creation of EMU.
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